



# The Real Shim Shady

William Ballenthin, FireEye

Jonathan Tomczak, Mandiant

# Bio, plan

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- William Ballenthin, Reverse Engineer
  - FLARE (FireEye Labs Advanced Reverse Engineering) team
  - Malware analysis, forward and backward engineering
- Jonathan Tomczak, Consultant
  - Mandiant Professional Services
  - Incident response, forensics, tool development
- Today's Topic: Case Study and Investigative Techniques for Hijacked Application Compatibility Infrastructure.

# Put out the Fire!

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- Working the malware triage queue, encountered interesting situation:
  - Client targeted by phishing emails
  - Large deployment FireEye boxes didn't fire
  - Malware maintained persistence, somehow
- What's going on? How to fix detection & investigative methodology?

# DLL Injection via Shims

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- Malware: self-extracting RAR
  - drops KORPLUG launcher (`ellogger.dll`)
  - loading shellcode backdoor (`ellogger.dat`)
- `ellogger.dat` does a little of everything: manually loads PE payload, injects, privesc, installs service, HTTP protocol
- Also, installs an ACI shim:
  - Writes two (32/64-bit) hardcoded, embedded SDB files to disk
  - Invokes `sdbinst.exe`

# WHAT'S THE ACI?

What are shims and why are they on my system?

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# Application Compatibility Infrastructure

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- Manages and resolves application compatibility issues with updates to Microsoft Windows
- Configured via freely available Application Compatibility Toolkit (ACT)
- API hooking (& more) built into the executable Loader
  - “Shims” typically implemented as code (DLLs) or configuration (disable feature)
  - Shims described by databases (SDB files) indicating source and target
  - SDBs registered with the OS, queried by loader

# Application Compatibility Infrastructure, II

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- Targets specified by executable file metadata, including:
  - Filename
  - PE checksum
  - File size
  - Version info fields, etc.
- Lots of shims to play with
  - Dozens of preconfigured quickfixes (redirect file reads, change heap behavior)
  - Thousands of SDB entries distributed by MS
  - Some undocumented features
    - EMET uses ACI to inject its DLL into processes on execution

# SDB contents

---

```
<EXE>
  <NAME type='stringref'>OREGON32.EXE</NAME>
  <APP_NAME type='stringref'>The Oregon Trail v1.2</APP_NAME>
  <VENDOR type='stringref'>Minnesota Educational Computing Corp.</VENDOR>
  <EXE_ID type='hex'>568058f1-da4f-4105-8f72-edd5d2a4aaf3</EXE_ID>
    <APP_ID type='hex'>82f31111-af62-4849-b866-14c4e748e33c</APP_ID>
  <MATCH_MODE type='integer'>0x2</MATCH_MODE>
  <MATCHING_FILE>
    <NAME type='stringref'>OREGON32.DLL</NAME>
  </MATCHING_FILE>
  <SHIM_REF>
    <NAME type='stringref'>EmulateGetDiskFreeSpace</NAME>
    <SHIM_TAGID type='integer'>0x23298</SHIM_TAGID>
  </SHIM_REF>
</EXE>
```




# SHIM TECHNIQUES

Shim development, creation, and deployment

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# The Application Compatibility Toolkit



# SDB deployment

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- `sdbinst.exe` registers SDB files with operating system
  - Creates uninstallation entries in the control panel
  - Add values to Registry keys:
    - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom
    - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB
- Microsoft recommends packaging in an MSI and deploying via GPO
- Directly adding the Registry values circumvent `sdbinst.exe` and extra control panel entries

# Fun shims

Shim Name	Purpose
DisableWindowsDefender	<i>“The fix disables Windows Defender for security applications that do not work with Windows Defender.”</i>
CorrectFilePaths	Redirect file system paths
LoadLibraryRedirectFlag	Change load directory of DLLs
NoSignatureCheck	??? ☺
RelaunchElevated	Ensure an EXE runs as admin
TerminateExe	??? ☺
VirtualRegistry	Registry redirection and expansion

# Trick 1: DLL Injection via shims (seen in wild)

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- Self-extracting RAR
  - drops KORPLUG launcher (`ellogger.dll`)
  - loading shellcode backdoor (`ellogger.dat`)
- `ellogger.dat` does some of everything: manually loads PE payload, injects, privesc, installs service, HTTP protocol
- Also, installs an ACI shim:
  - Writes two (32/64-bit) hardcoded, embedded SDB files to disk
  - Invokes `sdbinst.exe`

# SDB contents

---

```
<DATABASE><NAME type='stringref'>Brucon_Database</NAME>
  <DATABASE_ID type='guid'>503ec3d4-165b-4771-b798-099d43b833ed</DATABASE_ID>
  <LIBRARY> <SHIM>
    <NAME type='stringref'>Brucon_Shim</NAME>
    <DLLFILE type='stringref'>Custom\elogger.dll</DLLFILE>
  </SHIM></LIBRARY>
  <EXE>
    <NAME type='stringref'>svchost.exe</NAME>
    <APP_NAME type='stringref'>Brucon_Apps</APP_NAME>
    <EXE_ID type='hex'>e8cc2eb6-469d-43bc-9d6a-de089e497303</EXE_ID>
    <MATCHING_FILE><NAME type='stringref'>*</NAME></MATCHING_FILE>
    <SHIM_REF><NAME type='stringref'>Brucon_Shim</NAME></SHIM_REF>
  </EXE></DATABASE>
```

# Analysis

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- Persistence configured via opaque file format
- Hardcoded SDB file easily sig-able via filenames, IDs
  - Payload file exists in the clear, in very limited set of directories
    - C:\Windows\AppPatch\Custom\
    - C:\Windows\AppPatch\Custom\Custom64\
- FireEye identified filename `ellogger.dll` often reused in KORPLUG & SOGU campaigns.

## Trick 2: Argument replacement via shims (seen in lab)

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- `CorrectFilePath` fix redirects arguments from the application's path to an attacker's specified path
  - Trivial to hook into `CreateProcess`, `WinExec`, `ShellExecute`
- Custom program `mine.exe`, launches `C:\windows\temp\1.exe`
  - Add shim: redirects `C:\windows\temp\1.exe` to `C:\dump\1.exe`
  - `CorrectFilePath`: `"C:\windows\temp\1.exe; C:\dump\1.exe"`



# SDB contents

---

```
<DATABASE><TIME type='integer'>0x1d100fac0a4a7fc</TIME>
  <NAME type='stringref'>minesdb</NAME>
  <DATABASE_ID type='guid'>
    2840a82e-91ff-4f29-bff2-fd1e9780b6eb</DATABASE_ID>
  <EXE>
    <APP_NAME type='stringref'>mine.exe</APP_NAME>
    <MATCHING_FILE><NAME type='stringref'>*</NAME></MATCHING_FILE>
    <SHIM_REF>
      <NAME type='stringref'>CorrectFilePaths</NAME>
      <COMMAND_LINE type='stringref'>
        "C:\Windows\Temp\1.exe; C:\dump\1.exe"
      </COMMAND_LINE>
    </SHIM_REF></EXE></DATABASE>
```

## Trick 2: Argument replacement via shims, II

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- Analysis:
  - Consider the targeted process is `cmd.exe`
    - Hidden persistence, MITM of process creation
    - #DFIR confusion
  - Configured via opaque file format
  - Payload not limited to specific directories

## Trick 3: Shellcode injection via shims (seen in wild)

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- Phishing email leads to dropper
  - dropper installs template SDB and modifies them dynamically
  - SDB declares shellcode that it injects on executable load*
  - payload is a downloader for other stages
- First identified by TrendMicro...

# SDB contents

---

```
<DATABASE><NAME type='stringref'>opera.exe</NAME>
  <DATABASE_ID>
    538f5e1c-932e-4426-b1c9-60a6e15bcd7f</DATABASE_ID>
  <LIBRARY><SHIM_REF><PATCH>
    <NAME type='stringref'>patchdata0</NAME>
    <PATCH_BITS type='hex'>040000c...0000000000000000</PATCH_BITS>
  </PATCH></SHIM_REF></LIBRARY>
<EXE><APP_NAME type='stringref'>opera.exe</APP_NAME>
  <MATCHING_FILE><NAME>opera.exe</NAME></MATCHING_FILE>
  <PATCH_REF>
    <NAME type='stringref'>patchdata0</NAME>
    <PATCH_TAGID type='integer'>0x6c</PATCH_TAGID>
  </PATCH_REF></EXE></DATABASE>
```

# PATCH\_BITS

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- Windows loader writes arbitrary bytes into module memory
  - `PATCH_MATCH` to verify target of memory write
  - `PATCH_REPLACE` stamps in raw bytes
  - Can target both EXE and DLL modules

## Patch details

---

00000000 (04) opcode: PATCH\_MATCH  
0000000c (04) rva: 0x00053c2e  
00000014 (64) module\_name:  
u'kernel32.dll'  
00000054 (05) pattern: 9090909090

disassembly:

0x53c2e: nop

0x53c2f: nop

0x53c30: nop

0x53c31: nop

0x53c32: nop

00000000 (04) opcode: PATCH\_REPLACE  
0000000c (04) rva: 0x00053c2e  
00000014 (64) module\_name:  
u'kernel32.dll'  
00000054 (07) pattern: e8321a0700ebf9

disassembly:

0x53c2e: call 0x000c5665

0x53c33: ~~jmp 0x00053c29~~

## Patch details, II

---

00000000 (04) opcode: PATCH\_MATCH

0000000c (04) rva: 0x000c5665

00000014 (64) module\_name:  
u'kernel32.dll'

00000054 (08) pattern:  
0000000000000000

00000000 (04) opcode: PATCH\_REPLACE

0000000c (04) rva: 0x000c5665

00000014 (64) module\_name: u'kernel32.dll'

00000054 (14) pattern:  
83042402609ce8030000009d61c3

disassembly:

0xc5665: add dword [esp],2

0xc5669: pushad

0xc566a: pushfd

0xc566b: call 0x000c566d

0xc5670: popfd

0xc5671: popad

0xc5672: ret

## Patch details, III



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`< Multi-kilobyte shellcode downloader >`




## Patch details, summary


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
## Patch details, summary




## Patch details, summary




## Patch details, summary




## Patch details, summary



## Patch details, summary



# Patch details, summary



# Analysis

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- Persistence & injection by MS infrastructure!
- External storage of shellcode in opaque format
- Dynamic modification of SDB files from template
  - Generates unique GUIDs for database ID
  - Extensible payloads
  - `PATCH_BYTES` not documented



# FLYING THROUGH THE MATRIX

## Understanding SDB files

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# SDB file format

- The SDB file format is an undocumented Microsoft format
  - apphelp.dll exposes ~254 exports for manipulating shims
  - That doesn't help for forensic analysis!

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F	
0000h:	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	73	64	62	66	02	78	5A	11	.....	sdbf	.	x	Z	.											
0010h:	02	00	03	78	34	36	01	00	02	38	07	70	03	38	01	60	...x46...	8	.	p	.	8	.	`									
0020h:	16	40	01	00	00	00	01	98	20	36	01	00	45	58	45	2E	.@.....	~	6	..	EXE	.											
0030h:	45	54	47	21	E2	9C	04	00	45	2E	31	45	52	53	49	21	ETG!âæ..	E	.	1	ERSI	!											
0040h:	5E	9D	04	00	45	2E	32	45	52	53	49	21	DA	9D	04	00	^...E.	2	ERSI	!	Ú	...											
0050h:	45	2E	41	45	52	53	49	21	56	9E	04	00	45	2E	42	45	E.AERSI!	V	Ž	..	E	.BE											
0060h:	52	53	49	21	D2	9E	04	00	45	58	45	2E	45	54	4B	21	RSI!Òž..	EXE	.	ETK	!												
0070h:	4E	9F	04	00	4C	4F	41	5F	5F	24	24	24	CA	9F	04	00	NŸ..LOA_	\$\$\$Ê	Ÿ	..													
0080h:	5F	53	43	5F	5F	24	24	24	C6	A0	04	00	2E	30	30	30	SC_\$\$\$	Ê	...	000													
0090h:	35	39	32	30	C2	A1	04	00	2E	30	30	31	35	39	32	30	5920Â;	...	0015920														

# SDB file format, II

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- So, we reverse engineered it
- Conceptually, like an indexed XML document
  - Three main nodes: the index, the database structure, and a string table
  - No compression, encryption, signatures, nor checksums

# Consider the scenario

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- Shim definition: name & shim action

```
<LIBRARY> <SHIM>  
  <NAME type='stringref'>Brucon_Shim</NAME>  
  <DLLFILE type='stringref'>Custom\elogger.dll</DLLFILE>  
</SHIM></LIBRARY>
```

- Application definition: target & shim pointer

```
<NAME type='stringref'>svchost.exe</NAME>  
<APP_NAME type='stringref'>Brucon_Apps</APP_NAME>  
<SHIM_REF>  
  <NAME type='stringref'>Brucon_Shim</NAME>  
  <SHIM_TAGID type='integer'>0x47c</SHIM_TAGID>  
</SHIM_REF>
```

# python-sdb

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- Some tools exist for unpacking SDB files
  - But they rely on the Windows API
- `python-sdb` is a cross platform, pure Python library for parsing SDBs
  - Python API makes it easy to build scripts that inspect SDB features
  - Provided sample scripts dump database as various XML flavors
- <https://github.com/williballenthin/python-sdb>

# DETECTION METHODOLOGY

Investigating malicious shims at scale in a large environment

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# Consider the scenario

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- *Trojan.mambashim*

- Python (what, just read the source!?!)
- Obfuscated bytecode
- Installs service, or uses `ctypes` to dynamically create `sdb` and install
- `sdb` causes Windows loader to inject DLL payload launcher into `putty44.exe`

**Would you have any idea this was happening to your environment?**

# Existing administrative tools?

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- Fact: *Trojan.mambashim* generates random sdb path using a dictionary of English words, installs using `sdbinst.exe`
- ACI Fails:
  - No central management for SDBs on a system
  - No Active Directory tools for SDB management
  - No accounting of ACI changes or rollback features
- Win?
  - Maybe catch `sdbinst.exe` via process auditing?



# ACI Integrity checking?

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- SDB files are not signed ☹️
- Whitelisting SDBs by hash does **not** work
  - eg. collection across 6,000 hosts yields 18,000 unique SDB files
- Embedded timestamps and installation order affect SDB integrity checks
  - If Office is installed before Visual Studio, and then vice versa on another system, it may result in a different SDB.

# Mass inspection & anomaly detection

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- Acquire, inspect %systemdrive%\\*.sdb
  - Legitimate SDBs typically reside in Windows and Program Files
  - Attacker SDBs found in %USERPROFILE%, working directories
- Acquire, inspect
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB
- Default sdb: drvmain, frxmain, msimain, pcamain, sysmain

# Mass inspection & anomaly detection

---

- *Trojan.mambashim*
  - Random header timestamp (range 0-max int64 (!!!)) ☐
  - Random compiler version (`rand.rand.rand.rand`) ☐
  - EXE vendor name `vendor` ☐
  - Random database ID (well, it's a GUID...) ☐
  - Random EXE ID (also GUID...) ☐
- But, blacklist won't scale
- Good for hunting, not fire and forget

# Mass inspection & anomaly detection, II

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**Microsoft-Windows-Application-Experience-Program-Telemetry.evtx**

Compatibility fix applied to **C:\PROGRAM FILES\Putty\putty44.exe**.

Fix information: **vendor**, {7e4053fe-ade9-426f-9dc2-0bbfa76b5366},  
0x80010156.

- Do you have technology that can detect “unusual entries”?
  - Count tuple (hostname, vendor, application) & sort ASC
  - Alert on new tuples?

# Domain specific hashing

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- Realistically, *Trojan.mambashim* could be much nastier.
- We don't expect blacklisting to scale, that's just playing catch up
- We really want to whitelist:
  - But, can't whitelist entire files by hash (see earlier)
  - **Can** hash shim & application definitions
    - Don't expect these to change
    - Use this to build a whitelist!
  - `shims_hash_shims.py`

# Prepare for this scenario

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- `https://github.com/ganboing/sdb_packer`
  - Extract existing legit `sysmain.sdb`
  - Add new shim for `explorer.exe`, etc.
    - Payload: keylog data & shellcode that does exfil
  - Re-pack `sysmain.sdb`
  - Deploy
  - ???
  - Profit

# Shims are real. Don't get shimmed.

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- Both targeted and commodity threats are actively using ACI shims
  - There is no existing infrastructure for detection
  - Consider the risk
- 
- You are now the front line.

# Prior work

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- “Persist It - Using and Abusing Microsoft Fix It Patches” - Jon Erickson/iSIGHT @ BH '14  
<https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Erickson/Asia-14-Erickson-Persist-It-Using-And-Abusing-Microsofts-Fix-It-Patches.pdf>
- “Shim: A new method of injection” (in Russian)  
[ftp://os2.fannet.ru/fileechoes/programming/XA\\_159.PDF](ftp://os2.fannet.ru/fileechoes/programming/XA_159.PDF)
- “Roaming Tiger” - Anton Cherepanov/ESET @ ZeroNights '14  
[http://2014.zeronights.org/assets/files/slides/roaming\\_tiger\\_zeronights\\_2014.pdf](http://2014.zeronights.org/assets/files/slides/roaming_tiger_zeronights_2014.pdf)
- “Windows - Owned By Default!” – Mark Baggett @ DerbyCon 2013
- “Compatibility Fix Descriptions” - MSDN  
<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc722305%28v=ws.10%29.aspx>



THE END  
Questions?

# File Timestamp Indicators

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- Filesystem created timestamp indicates installation of SDB to the system
  - Windows Patch
  - Application Install
  - Malicious SDB that was pre-compiled before installation.
- Registry timestamps show installation timestamp
- Filesystem modified timestamp indicates that the SDB was recompiled.
  - Windows Patch
  - Application Install
  - Malicious injection into an existing SDB such as `sysmain.sdb`

# Notes on artifacts

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- FireEye identified filename `elogger.dll` often reused in KORPLUG & SOGU campaigns.
- `elogger.dll` exports `ShimMain` and `NotifyShims`, which are undocumented shim entry points. Some KORPLUG loaders also export these without SOGU payloads referencing the ACI.
- “Roaming Tiger” (ESET) campaign distributed SDB files with similar naming schemes:

<code>elogger.dat</code>	“Roaming Tiger”
<code>Brucon_Shim</code>	<code>AcProtect_Shim</code>
<code>Brucon_Apps</code>	<code>AcProtect_Apps</code>
<code>Brucon_Database</code>	<code>AcProtect_Database</code>

# Shim DLL exports

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Shim DLL export name	Shim DLL export purpose
SE_DllLoaded	Callback during DLL load
SE_DLLUnloaded	Callback during DLL unload
SE_DynamicShim	Unknown
SE_GetProcAddress	Callback during GetProcAddress
SE_InstallAfterInit	Callback after shim complete
SE_InstallBeforeInit	Callback before shim application
SE_IsShimDLL	Callback when shimming shim DLL
SE_Process	Callback when EXE exiting